US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0033/00334.txt

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$Title{Gettysburg
The Situation & The Battle, Spring, 1863}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Tilberg, Frederick}
$Affiliation{National Park Service}
$Subject{union
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confederate
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$Volume{Handbook 9}
$Date{1962}
$Log{The Gettysburg Campaign*0033401.scf
General Meade*0033402.scf
Gettysburg*0033403.scf
Little Round Top*0033404.scf
Hasty Defenses*0033405.scf
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Book:        Gettysburg
Author:      Tilberg, Frederick
Affiliation: National Park Service
Volume:      Handbook 9
Date:        1962

                            Overview of Gettysburg

The little town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania was the site of one of the
decisive battles of the Civil War.  75,000 Confederate troops and 97,000 Union
troops fought in the fields around the town; when the battle was over, there
were 51,000 casualties and the Union had gained a key victory.  This is the
story of the historic battle, along with Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address
at the dedication of the national cemetery.

The Situation & The Battle, Spring, 1863

Introduction

     The gently rolling farm lands surrounding the little town of Gettysburg,
Pa., was fought one of the great decisive battles of American history.  For 3
days, from July 1 to 3, 1863, a gigantic struggle between 75,000 Confederates
and 97,000 Union troops raged about the town and left 51,000 casualties in its
wake.  Heroic deeds were numerous on both sides, climaxed by the famed
Confederate assault on July 3 which has become known throughout the world as
Pickett's Charge.  The Union victory gained on these fields ended the last
Confederate invasion of the North and marked the beginning of a gradual
decline in Southern military power.

[See The Gettysburg Campaign: Map of the Gettysburg Campaign.]

     Here also, a few months after the battle, Abraham Lincoln delivered his
classic Gettysburg Address at the dedication of the national cemetery set
apart as a burial ground for the soldiers who died in the conflict.

The Situation, Spring 1863

     The situation in which the Confederacy found itself in the late spring of
1863 called for decisive action.  The Union and Confederate armies had faced
each other on the Rappahannock River, near Fredericksburg, Va., for 6 months.
The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Gen. R. E. Lee, had
defeated the Union forces at Fredericksburg in December 1862 and again at
Chancellorsville in May 1863, but the nature of the ground gave Lee little
opportunity to follow up his advantage.  When he began moving his army
westward, on June 3, he hoped, at least, to draw his opponent away from the
river to a more advantageous battleground.  At most, he might carry the war
into northern territory, where supplies could be taken from the enemy and a
victory could be fully exploited.  Even a fairly narrow margin of victory
might enable Lee to capture one or more key cities and perhaps increase
northern demands for a negotiated peace.

     Confederate strategists had considered sending aid from Lee's army to
Vicksburg, which Grant was then besieging, or dispatching help to General
Bragg for his campaign against Rosecrans in Tennessee.  They concluded,
however, that Vicksburg could hold out until climatic conditions would force
Grant to withdraw, and they reasoned that the eastern campaign was more
important than that of Tennessee.

     Both Union and Confederate governments had bitter opponents at home.
Southern generals, reading in Northern newspapers the clamors for peace, had
reason to believe that their foe's morale was fast weakening.  They felt that
the Army of Northern Virginia would continue to demonstrate its superiority
over the Union Army of the Potomac and that the relief from constant
campaigning on their own soil would have a happy effect on Southern spirit.
Events were to prove, however, that the chief result of the intense alarm
created by the invasion was to rally the populace to better support of the
Union government.

The Plan of Campaign

     Lee's plan of campaign was undoubtedly similar to that of his invasion
which ended in the battle of Antietam in September 1862.  He then called
attention to the need of destroying the bridge over the Susquehanna River at
Harrisburg and of disabling the Pennsylvania Railroad in order to sever
communication with the west.  "After that," he added "I can turn my attention
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington as may seem best for our interest."

     Lee had suffered an irreparable loss at Chancellorsville when "Stonewall"
Jackson was mortally wounded.  Now reorganized into three infantry corps under
Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and R. S. Ewell, and a cavalry division under J. E. B.
Stuart, a changed Army of Northern Virginia faced the great test that lay
ahead.  "Stonewall" Jackson, the right hand of Lee, and in the words of the
latter "the finest executive officer the sun ever shone on," was no longer
present to lead his corps in battle.

     The long lines of gray started moving on June 3 from Fredericksburg, Va.,
first northwestward across the Blue Ridge, then northward in the Shenandoah
Valley.  On June 9, one of the greatest cavalry engagements of the war
occurred at Brandy Station.  Union horsemen, for the first time, held Stuart's
men on even terms.  The Confederates then continued their march northward,
with the right flank constantly protected by Stuart's cavalry, which occupied
the passes of the Blue Ridge.  Stuart was ordered to hold these mountain gaps
until the advance into Pennsylvania had drawn the Union Army north of the
Potomac.  On June 28, Hill and Longstreet reached Chambersburg, 16 miles north
of the Pennsylvania boundary.  Rodes' division of Ewell's corps reached
Carlisle on June 27.  Early's command of 8,000 men had passed through
Gettysburg on June 26 and on the 28th had reached York.  Early planned to take
possession of the bridge over the Susquehanna at Columbia, and to move on
Harrisburg from the east.  Lee's converging movement on Harrisburg seemed to
be on the eve of success.

     An unforeseen shift of events between June 25 and 28, however, threatened
to deprive Lee of every advantage he had thus far gained in his daring march
up the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys.  The cavalry engagement between
Stuart and Pleasonton at Brandy Station convinced Gen. Joseph Hooker, then in
command of the Union Army, that the Confederate Army was moving northward.
President Lincoln and General in Chief Halleck, informed of this movement,
ordered Hooker to proceed northward and to keep his command between the
Confederate Army and Washington.  When he was refused permission to abandon
Harpers Ferry, and to add the garrison of 10,000 men to his army, Hooker asked
to be relieved of command.  Gen. George G. Meade received orders to assume
command of the army at Frederick, Md., on June 28, and he at once continued
the march northward.

[See General Meade: Major Gen. George Gordon Meade, Commander of the Union
Forces at Gettysburg.]

     General Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry, had obtained
conditional approval from Lee to operate against the rear of the Union Army as
it marched northward and then to join Lee north of the Potomac.  As he passed
between Hooker's army and Washington, the unexpected speed of the Union Army
forced Stuart into detours and delays, so that on June 28 he was in eastern
Maryland, wholly out of touch with the Confederate force.  The eyes and ears
of Lee were thus closed at a time when their efficient functioning was badly
needed.

     In this state of affairs, a Confederate agent reported to Lee at
Chambersburg, Pa., on the night of June 28, that the Union forces had crossed
the Potomac and were in the vicinity of Frederick.  With the entire Union Army
close at hand and with many miles between him and his base, Lee decided to
abandon his original plan and to concentrate for battle.  He moved his army at
once across the mountains to Cashtown, 8 miles from Gettysburg.  Here, near
Cashtown, he planned to establish his battle position.  Rodes, then at
Carlisle, and Early, at York, were at once ordered to this point.

The First Day

Two Armies Converge on Gettysburg

     The men of Heth's division, leading the Confederate advance across the
mountain, reached Cashtown on June 29.  Pettigrew's brigade was sent on to
Gettysburg the following day to obtain supplies, but upon reaching the ridge a
mile west of the town, they observed a column of Union cavalry approaching.
Not having orders to bring on an engagement, Pettigrew withdrew to Cashtown.

     In the intervening 2 days since he had assumed command of the Union
forces, General Meade had moved his troops northward and instructed his
engineers to survey a defensive battle position at Pipe Creek, near Taneytown,
in northern Maryland.  Buford's cavalry, which had effectively shadowed Lee's
advance from the mountaintops of the Blue Ridge, was ordered to make a
reconnaissance in the Gettysburg area.  It was these troops that Pettigrew's
men saw posted on the roads leading into the town.  Neither Lee nor Meade yet
foresaw Gettysburg as a field of battle.  Each expected to take a strong
defensive position and force his adversary to attack.

     A. P. Hill, in the absence of Lee, who was still beyond the mountains,
now took the initiative.  At daybreak of July 1, he ordered the brigades of
Archer and Davis, of Heth's division, to advance along the Chambersburg Road
to Gettysburg for the purpose of testing the strength of the Union forces. As
these troops reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, they were fired
upon by Union cavalry pickets who hurriedly retired to inform their commander
of the enemy's approach.  In the meantime, Buford's division of cavalry had
moved from their camp just southwest of Gettysburg to McPherson Ridge, a mile
west of the town Buford prepared to hold out against heavy odds until aid
arrived.  Thus, subordinate field commanders had chosen the ground for battle.

[See Gettysburg: Gettysburg, as it appeared from Seminary Ridge a short time
after the battle.]

     It was 8 a.m., July 1, when the two brigades of Archer and Davis, the
former to the right and the latter to the left of the Chambersburg Road,
deployed on Herr Ridge.  Supported by Pegram's artillery, they charged down
the long slope and across Willoughby Run against Buford's men.  The cavalry
had an advantage in their rapid-fire, breech-loading carbines.  Dismounted,
and fighting as infantrymen, they held their ground against the spirited
attacks of Heth's superior numbers.  At 10 o'clock timely aid arrived as
troops from Gen. John F. Reynolds' First Infantry corps began streaming over
Seminary Ridge from the south and relieved Buford's exhausted fighters.
Calef's battery, one of whose guns had fired the first Union cannon shot at
Gettysburg, was replaced by Hall's Maine artillery.  But, in a few moments,
Union joy at receiving aid was offset by tragedy.  Reynolds, close to the
front lines, was killed instantly by a sharpshooter's bullet.

     The struggle increased in scope as more forces reached the field.  When
Archer's Confederates renewed the attack across Willoughby Run, Union troops
of Meredith's Iron Brigade, arriving opportunely, struck the flank of the
Confederates, routing them and capturing close to 100 men, including General
Archer.  Relieved from the threat south of the Chambersburg Pike, the 14th
Brooklyn and 95th New York regiments shifted to the north of the Pike where
the Confederates were overwhelming the Union defenders.  With renewed effort,
these troops, joined by Dawes' 6th Wisconsin, drove the Confederates steadily
back, capturing 200 Mississippians in a railroad cut.  The Confederates then
withdrew beyond striking distance.  There was a lull in the fighting during
the noon hour.  The first encounter had given Union men confidence.  They had
held their ground against superior numbers and had captured Archer, a
brigadier general, the first Confederate general officer taken since Lee
assumed command.

The Battle of Oak Ridge

     While the initial test of strength was being determined west of
Gettysburg by advance units, the main bulk of the two armies was pounding over
the roads from the north and south, converging upon the ground chosen by
Buford.  Rodes' Confederates, hurrying southward from Carlisle to meet Lee at
Cashtown, received orders at Biglerville to march to Gettysburg.  Early,
returning from York with Cashtown as his objective, learned at Heidlersburg of
the action at Gettysburg and was ordered to approach by way of the Harrisburg
Road.

     Employing the wooded ridge as a screen from Union cavalry north of
Gettysburg, Rodes brought his guns into position on Oak Ridge about 1 o'clock
and opened fire on the flank of Gen. Abner Doubleday, Reynolds' successor, on
McPherson Ridge.  The Union commander shifted his lines northeastward to Oak
Ridge and the Mummasburg Road to meet the new attack.  Rodes' Confederates
struck the Union positions at the stone wall on the ridge, but the attack was
not well coordinated and resulted in failure.  Iverson's brigade was nearly
annihilated as it made a left wheel to strike from the west.  In the meantime,
more Union troops had arrived on the field by way of the Taneytown Road.  Two
divisions of Howard's Eleventh corps were now taking position in the plain
north of the town, intending to make contact with Doubleday's troops on Oak
Ridge.

     Doles' Confederate brigade charged across the plain and was able to force
Howard's troops back temporarily, but it was the opportune approach of Early's
division from the northeast on the Harrisburg Road which rendered the Union
position north of Gettysburg indefensible.  Arriving in the early afternoon as
the Union men were establishing their position, Early struck with tremendous
force, first with his artillery and then with his infantry, against General
Barlow.  Soon he had shattered the entire Union force.  The remnants broke and
turned southward through Gettysburg in the direction of Cemetery Hill.  In
this headlong and disorganized flight General Schimmelfenning was lost from
his command, and, finding refuge in a shed, he lay 2 days concealed within the
Confederate lines.  In the path of Early's onslaught lay the youthful
Brigadier Barlow severely wounded, and the gallant Lieut.  Bayard Wilkeson,
whose battery had long stood against overwhelming odds, mortally wounded.

     The Union men on Oak Ridge, faced with the danger that Doles would cut
off their line of retreat, gave way and retired through Gettysburg to Cemetery
Hill.  The withdrawal of the Union troops from the north and northwest left
the Union position on McPherson Ridge untenable.  Early in the afternoon, when
Rodes opened fire from Oak Hill, Heth had renewed his thrust along the
Chambersburg Pike.  His troops were soon relieved and Pender's division,
striking north and south of the road, broke the Union line.  The Union troops
first withdrew to Seminary Ridge, then across the fields to Cemetery Hill.
Here was advantageous ground which had been selected as a rallying point if
the men were forced to relinquish the ground west and north of the town.
Thus, by 5 o'clock, the remnants of the Union forces (some 6,000 out of the
18,000 engaged in the first day's struggle) were on the hills south of
Gettysburg.

     Ewell was now in possession of the town, and he extended his line from
the streets eastward to Rock Creek.  Studiously observing the hills in his
front, he came within range of a Union sharpshooter, for suddenly he heard the
thud of a minie ball.  Calmly riding on, he remarked to General Gordon at his
side, "You see how much better fixed for a fight I am than you are.  It don't
hurt at all to be shot in a wooden leg."

     A momentous decision now had to be made.  Lee had reached the field at
3 p.m., and had witnessed the retreat of the disorganized Union troops through
the streets of Gettysburg.  Through his glasses he had watched their attempt
to reestablish their lines on Cemetery Hill.  Sensing his advantage and a
great opportunity, he sent orders to Ewell by a staff officer to "press those
people" and secure the hill (Cemetery Hill) if possible.  However, two of
Ewell's divisions, those of Rodes and Early, had been heavily engaged
throughout the afternoon and were not well in hand.  Johnson's division could
not reach the field until late in the evening, and the reconnaissance service
of Stuart's cavalry was not yet available.  General Ewell, uninformed of the
Union strength in the rear of the hills south of Gettysburg, decided to await
the arrival of Johnson's division.  Cemetery Hill was not attacked, and
Johnson, coming up late in the evening, stopped at the base of Culp's Hill.
Thus passed Lee's opportunity of July 1.

     When the Union troops retreated from the battleground north and west of
the town on the evening of July 1, they hastily occupied defense positions on
Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill, and a part of Cemetery Ridge.  Upon the arrival of
Slocum by the Baltimore Pike and Sickles by way of the Emmitsburg Road, the
Union right flank at Culp's Hill and Spangler's Spring and the important
position at Little Round Top on the left were consolidated.  Thus was
developed a strong defensive battle line in the shape of a fish hook, about 3
miles long, with the advantage of high ground and of interior lines. Opposite,
in a semicircle about 6 miles long, extending down Seminary Ridge and into the
streets of Gettysburg, stood the Confederates who, during the night, had
closed in from the north and west.

[See Little Round Top: Little Round Top from the northwest.]

     The greater part of the citizenry of Gettysburg, despite the prospect of
battle in their own yards, chose to remain in their homes.  Both army
commanders respected noncombatant rights to a marked degree.  Thus, in
contrast with the fields of carnage all about the village, life and property
of the civilian population remained unharmed, while the doors of churches,
schools, and homes were opened for the care of the wounded.

     General Meade, at Taneytown, had learned early in the afternoon of July 1
that a battle was developing and that Reynolds had been killed.  A large part
of his army was within 5 miles of Gettysburg.  Meade then sent General Hancock
to study and report on the situation.  Hancock reached the field just as the
Union troops were falling back to Cemetery Hill.  He helped to rally the
troops and left at 6 o'clock to report to Meade that in his opinion the battle
should be fought at Gettysburg.  Meade acted on this recommendation and
immediately ordered the concentration of the Union forces at that place. Meade
himself arrived near midnight on July 1.

The Second Day

Preliminary Movements and Plans

     The small college town of Gettysburg, with 2,400 residents at the time of
the battle, lay in the heart of a fertile country, surrounded by broad acres
of crops and pastures.  Substantial houses of industrious Pennsylvania farmers
dotted the countryside.  South of the town and hardly more than a musket shot
from the houses on its outer edge, Cemetery Hill rose somewhat abruptly from
the lower ground.  Extending southward from the hill for nearly 2 miles was a
long roll of land called Cemetery Ridge.  At its southern extremity a sharp
incline terminated in the wooded crest of Little Round Top and a half mile
beyond was the sugar-loaf peak of Big Round Top, the highest point in the
vicinity of Gettysburg.  Paralleling Cemetery Ridge, at an average distance of
two-thirds of a mile to the west, lay Seminary Ridge, which derived its name
from the Lutheran Seminary that stood upon its crest a half mile west of
Gettysburg.  In 1863, 10 roads radiated from Gettysburg, the one leading to
Emmitsburg extending diagonally across the valley between Seminary and
Cemetery Ridges.

     By noon of July 2, the powerful forces of Meade and Lee were at hand, and
battle on a tremendous scale was imminent.  That part of the Union line
extending from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top was strongly held.  Late in
the forenoon, Sickles, commanding the Third Corps which lay north of Little
Round Top, sent Berdan's sharpshooters and some of the men of the 3rd Maine
Regiment forward from the Emmitsburg Road to Pitzer's Woods, a half mile to
the west.  As they reached the woods, a strong Confederate force fired upon
them, and they hurriedly retired to inform their commander.  To Sickles, the
extension of the Confederate line southward meant that his left flank was
endangered.  He at once began moving forward to the advantageous high ground
at the Peach Orchard, and by 3:30 p.m. his battle front extended from Devil's
Den northwestward to the Orchard and northward on the Emmitsburg Road.  In
this forward movement, the strong position on the crest of Little Round Top
was left unoccupied.  This was the situation when Meade finally turned his
attention from his right flank at Culp's Hill and Spangler's Spring - the
cause of his great concern throughout the forenoon - to review Sickles' line.

[See Hasty Defenses: Interior of breastworks on Little Round Top.]

     Lee planned to attack, despite the advice of Longstreet who continually
urged defensive battle.  On July 2, Longstreet recommended that Lee swing
around the Union left at Little Round Top, select a good position, and await
attack.  Lee observed that while the Union position was strong if held in
sufficient numbers to utilize the advantage of interior lines, it presented
grave difficulties to a weak defending force.  A secure lodgment on the shank
of the hook might render it possible to sever the Union Army and to deal with
each unit separately.  Not all of Meade's force had reached the field, and Lee
thought he had the opportunity of destroying his adversary in the process of
concentration.  He resolved to send Longstreet against the Federal left flank
which he believed was then on lower Cemetery Ridge, while Ewell was to storm
Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill.

Longstreet Attacks on the Right

     In the execution of this plan, Longstreet was ordered to take position
across the Emmitsburg Road and to attack what was thought to be the left flank
of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge.  From his encampment on the Chambersburg
Road, 3 miles west of Gettysburg, he started toward his objective, using Herr
Ridge to conceal the movement from Union signalmen on Little Round Top.  After
marching to Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield Road, he realized that his
troops were in sight of the signal unit and at once began retracing his
course.  Employing the trees on Seminary Ridge as a screen, he marched
southward again in Willoughby Run Valley, arriving in position on the
Emmitsburg Road about 3:30 p.m.  Immediately in front, and only 700 yards
away, Longstreet saw Sickles' batteries lined up in the Peach Orchard and on
the Emmitsburg Road.  Col. E. P. Alexander, commanding Longstreet's artillery
battalions, opened with full force against the Union guns.  A moment later,
Law's Alabama brigade stepped off with Robertson's Texans on the left.  They
advanced east, then swung toward the north, with Devil's Den and the Round
Tops in their path.

Warren Saves Little Round Top

     Gen. G. K. Warren, Meade's Chief of Engineers, after reviewing Sickles'
line with Meade, rode to the crest of Little Round Top and found the hill,
"the key to the Union position," unoccupied except by a signal station. Warren
was informed by the signalmen that they believed Confederate troops lay
concealed on the wooded ridge a mile to the west.  Smith's New York battery,
emplaced at Devil's Den, immediately was ordered to fire a shot into these
woods.  The missile, crashing through the trees, caused a sudden stir of the
Confederates "which by the gleam of the reflected sunlight on their bayonets,
revealed their long lines outflanking the position."  Warren realized
Longstreet would strike first at Little Round Top and he observed, too, the
difficulty of shifting Sickles' position from Devil's Den to the hill.

[See Devil's Den: Devil's Den, a formation of large granite boulders used as
defense positions by Confederate sharpshooters.]

     At this very moment, Sykes' Fifth Corps, marching from its reserve
position, began streaming across Cemetery Ridge toward the front.  Warren
sought aid from this corps.  In answer to his plea for troops, the brigades of
Vincent and Weed sprinted to Little Round Top.  Law's Alabama troops were
starting to scale the south slope of the hill when Vincent's men rushed to the
attack.  Weed's brigade, following closely, drove over the crest and engaged
Robertson's Texans on the west slope.  The arrival of Hazlett's battery on the
summit of the hill is thus described by an eyewitness:  "The passage of the
six guns through the roadless woods and amongst the rocks was marvelous.
Under ordinary circumstances it would have been considered an impossible feat,
but the eagerness of the men . . . brought them without delay to the very
summit, where they went immediately into battle."  A desperate hand-to-hand
struggle ensued.  Weed and Hazlett were killed, and Vincent was mortally
wounded - all young soldiers of great promise.

[See View from Little Round Top: View northward from Little Round Top, statue
of Gen. G.K. Warren in foreground. The Pennsylvania Memorial, Center, marks
the crest of Cemetery Ridge.]

     While Law and Robertson fought on Little Round Top, their comrades
struggled in the fields below.  The Confederate drive was taken up in turn by
the brigades of Benning, Anderson, Kershaw, Semmes, Barksdale, Wofford,
Wilcox, Perry, and Wright against the divisions of three Federal corps in the
Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and along the Emmitsburg Road.  Four hours of
desperate fighting broke the Peach Orchard salient, an angle in the Union line
which was struck from the south and the west.  It left the Wheatfield strewn
with dead and wounded, and the base of Little Round Top a shambles. Sickles'
men had been driven back, and Longstreet was now in possession of the west
slope of Big Round Top, of Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. Little Round
Top, that commanding landmark which, in Confederate hands would have unhinged
the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, still remained in Union possession.

Culp's Hill

     In the Confederate plan, Ewell on the left was directed to attack
Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill in conjunction with Longstreet's drive.  At the
appointed time, the guns of Latimer's battalion on Benner's Hill, east of
Gettysburg, opened a well-directed fire against the Union positions on East
Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, but the return fire soon shattered many of
Latimer's batteries and forced the remnants to retire out of range.  In the
final moments of this action the youthful Major Latimer was mortally wounded.

     About dusk, long after the artillery fire had ceased, Johnson's division
charged the Union works on Culp's Hill.  Although his right failed to make
headway because of the steep incline and the strength of the Union positions,
Stewart's brigade on the left had better luck.  Here, on the southern slope of
the hill, the Union works were thinly manned.  An hour earlier, the divisions
of Geary and Ruger had been called from these works to reinforce the Union
center.  Johnson, finding the works weakly defended, took possession of them
but did not press the attack further.  Only a few hundred yards away on the
Baltimore Pike lay the Union supply trains.  Failure of Confederate
reconnaissance here again was critically important.  Thus passed another
opportunity to strike a hard blow at the Union Army.

     Closely timed with Johnson's assault, Early's infantry started a charge
toward East Cemetery Hill.  Seldom if ever surpassed in its dash and
desperation, Early's assault reached the crest of the hill where the
defenders, as a last resort in the hand-to-hand encounter, used clubbed
muskets, stones, and rammers.  Long after dark, Early's Louisiana and North
Carolina troops fought to hold the crest of the hill and their captured guns.
But the failure of Rodes to move out of the streets of Gettysburg and attack
the hill from the west enabled Hancock to shift some of his men to aid in
repelling Early's attack.  Faced by these Union reserves, Early's men finally
gave way about 10 o'clock and sullenly retired to their lines.  The Union
troops stood firm.

The Third Day

Cannonade at Dawn:  Culp's Hill and Spangler's Spring

     Night brought an end to the bloody combat at East Cemetery Hill, but this
was not the time for rest.  What would Meade do?  Would the Union Army remain
in its established position and hold its lines at all costs?  At midnight
Meade sought the advice of his Council of War in the east room of his
headquarters.  The corps commanders - Gibbon, Williams, Sykes, Newton, Howard,
Hancock, Sedgwick, and Slocum - without exception advised holding the
positions established.  Meade, approving, turned to the officer whose division
held the Union center, and said, "Gibbon, if Lee attacks me tomorrow it will
be in your front."

     Despite this prediction, Meade took no unusual measures next day to
fortify the center of his line.  In fact, by morning he seemed convinced that
the Confederate attack would continue against his left.  Thus the strong
forces there, three corps, were left in place.  Hancock's Second Corps,
holding the center, did strengthen the stone wall running along its front. And
General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, brought up reserve batteries to hold in
readiness for replacement of front line guns.

     Meanwhile, important movements were occurring elsewhere on the field.
Ruger's division and Lockwood's brigade, which had been called from their
lines on the south slope of Culp's Hill the previous evening to buttress the
weakened Federal forces on Cemetery Ridge, had countermarched, under cover of
darkness, to reoccupy their ground.  Geary, who had misunderstood orders and
had marched down the Baltimore Pike, had also returned to his works. Ruger's
men, upon reaching the Pike, learned from scouts that their entrenchments
south of Culp's Hill and at Spangler's Spring had been occupied by the
Confederates.  Ruger, resolving upon an attack at daybreak, organized his
forces along the Pike.  Powerful artillery units under Muhlenberg were brought
into place along the road; Rigby's Maryland battery was stationed on Power's
Hill, a prominent knoll a half mile to the south; and another battery was
emplaced on McAllister Hill.

     As dawn broke on July 3, Union guns on the Baltimore Pike opened with a
heavy cannonade on Johnson's Confederates at Spangler's Spring.  The heavily
wooded area about the Confederate lines prevented them from bringing guns into
position to return the fire.  Union skirmishers began streaming across the
field toward the Confederate entrenchments.  The full force of Ruger's and
Geary's divisions was soon committed.  Throughout the forenoon the opposing
lines exchanged extremely heavy fire.

     It was about 10 o'clock that Ruger, believing that a flank attack might
break the resistance of Johnson's men, ordered Col. Silas Colgrove to strike
the Confederate left flank near the spring.  The troops of the 2d
Massachusetts and the 27th Indiana regiments started across the swale from the
cover of the woods on the little hill south of the spring.  A withering fire
slowed their pace, but they charged on, only to have their ranks decimated by
the Confederates in strong positions back of a stone wall. Colonel Mudge,
inspiring leader of the Massachusetts regiment, fell mortally wounded.  Forced
to fall back, the men soon learned their efforts had not been in vain.  On
Ruger's and Geary's front the Confederates were now giving way and soon had
retired across Rock Creek, out of striking range.  By 11 o'clock, the Union
troops were again in possession of their earthworks; again they could quench
their thirst in the cooling waters of the spring.

Lee Plans a Final Thrust

     General Lee must have learned by mid forenoon, after the long hours of
struggle at Culp's Hill and Spangler's Spring, that his troops could not hold
the Union works which they had occupied with so little effort the previous
evening.  He had seen, also that in the tremendous battling during the
preceding afternoon no important gains had been made at Little Round Top and
its vicinity.  Longstreet had gained the advantageous ridge at the Peach
Orchard and had brought his batteries forward from Pitzer's Woods to this high
ground in preparation for a follow-up attack.  Wright's brigade, the last unit
to move forward on July 2 in the echelon attack begun by General Law, had
charged across the open fields at dusk and pierced the Union center just south
of the copse of trees on Cemetery Ridge.  Wright's success could not be
pressed to decisive advantage as the brigades on his left had not moved
forward to his support, and he was forced to retire.  Again, lack of
coordination in attack was to count heavily against the Confederates.

     The failure to make any pronounced headway on July 2 at Culp's Hill and
Little Round Top, and the momentary success of Wright on Cemetery Ridge,
doubtless led Lee to believe that Meade's flanks were strong and his center
weak.  A powerful drive at the center might pierce the enemy's lines and fold
them back.  The shattered units might then be destroyed or captured at will.
Such a charge across open fields and in the face of frontal and flank fire
would, Lee well understood, be a gamble seldom undertaken.  Longstreet
strongly voiced his objection to such a move, insisting that "no 15,000 men
ever arrayed for battle can take that position."

     Time now was the important element.  Whatever could be done must be done
quickly.  Hood's and McLaws' divisions, who had fought bravely and lost
heavily at Round Top and the Wheatfield, were not in condition for another
severe test.  Early and Johnson on the left had likewise endured long,
unrelenting battle with powerful Union forces in positions of advantage.  The
men of Heth's and Pender's divisions had not been heavily engaged since the
first day's encounter west of Gettysburg.  These were the men, along with
Pickett's division, whom Lee would have to count on to bear the brunt of his
final great effort at Gettysburg.

Lee and Meade Set the Stage

     Late in the forenoon of July 3, General Meade had completed his plan of
defense.  Another Confederate attack could be expected:  "Where?" was still
the question.  General Hunt, sensing the danger, placed a formidable line of
batteries in position on the crest of Cemetery Ridge and alerted others in the
rear for emergency use.  As a final act of preparation, Meade inspected his
front at the stone wall, then rode southward to Little Round Top.  There, with
General Warren, he could see the long lines of massed Confederate batteries, a
sure indication of attack.  Meade rode back to his headquarters.

     Lee, on his part, had spent the forenoon organizing his attack formations
on Seminary Ridge.  Having reached his decision to strike the Union center, he
had ordered the movement of batteries from the rear to points of advantage.
By noon, about 140 guns were in line from the Peach Orchard northward to the
Seminary buildings, many of them only 800 yards from the Union center.  To
Colonel Alexander fell the lot of directing the artillery fire and informing
the infantry of the best opportunity to advance.

     Massed to the west of Emmitsburg Road, on low ground which screened their
position from the Union lines, lay Gen. George Pickett's three brigades
commanded by Kemper, Armistead, and Garnett.  Pickett's men had arrived the
previous evening from Chambersburg, where they had guarded Lee's wagons on
July 1 and 2.  As a division these units had seen little fighting.  Soon they
would gain immortality.  On Pickett's left, the attacking front was fast being
organized.  Joseph Pettigrew, a brigadier, was preparing to lead the division
of the wounded Major General Heth, and Maj. Gen. Isaac Trimble took the
command of Pender.  Nearly 10,000 troops of these two divisions - including
such units as the 26th North Carolina whose losses on the first day were so
heavy that the dead marked their advance "with the accuracy of a line at a
dress parade" - now awaited the order to attack.  Many hours earlier, the
Bliss farm buildings, which lay in their front, had been burned.  Their
objective on the ridge was in clear view.  The brigades of Wilcox and Lang
were to move forward on the right of Pickett in order to protect his flank as
he neared the enemy position.

     General Stuart, in the meantime, had been out of touch with Lee.  Moving
northward on the right flank of the Union Army, he became involved in a sharp
engagement at Hanover, Pa., on June 30.  Seeking to regain contact with Lee,
he arrived at Carlisle on the evening of July 1.  As he began shelling the
barracks, orders arrived from Lee and he at once marched for Gettysburg,
arriving north of the town the next day.

     Early on July 3 he was ordered to take position on the Confederate left.
This movement usually has been interpreted as an integral part of Lee's
assault plan.  But battle reports leave Stuart's role vague, except for
covering the Confederate left.  Doubtless he would have exploited any
significant success achieved by the infantry assault.

     Except for the intermittent sniping of sharpshooters, an ominous silence
prevailed over the fields.  The orders had now been given; the objective had
been pointed out.  Men talked of casual things.  Some munched on hard bread,
others looked fearfully to the eastward, where, with the same mixed feelings,
lay their adversary.

     Far to the south, on another crucial front, General Pemberton was penning
a letter to General Grant asking terms for the surrender of Vicksburg.  In
Richmond, the sick and anxious Jefferson Davis looked hopefully for heartening
word from his great field commander at Gettysburg.  The outcome of this bold
venture would count heavily in the balance for the cause of the Confederacy.

Artillery Duel at One O'Clock

     At 1 p.m. two guns of Miller's Battery, posted near the Peach Orchard,
opened fire in rapid succession.  It was the signal for the entire line to let
loose their terrific blast.  Gunners rushed to their cannon, and in a few
moments the massed batteries shook the countryside.  Firing in volleys and in
succession, the air was soon filled with smoke and heavy dust, which darkened
the sky.  Union gunners on Cemetery Ridge waited a few minutes until the
positions of the Confederate batteries were located; then 80 guns, placed in
close order, opened fire.  For nearly 2 hours the duel continued, then the
Union fire slackened.  Hunt had ordered a partial cessation in order to cool
the guns and conserve ammunition.

     Colonel Alexander, in position on the Emmitsburg Road near the Peach
Orchard, could observe the effectiveness of his fire on the Union lines and
also keep the Confederate troops in view.  To him, it appeared that Union
artillery fire was weakening.  His own supply of ammunition was running low.
Believing this was the time to attack, Alexander sent a message to Pickett who
in turn rode over to Longstreet.  General Longstreet, who had persistently
opposed Lee's plan of sending 15,000 men across the open ground, was now faced
with a final decision.  Longstreet merely nodded approval and Pickett saluted,
saying, "I am going to move forward, sir."  He rode back to his men and
ordered the advance.  With Kemper on the right, Garnett on the left, and
Armistead a few yards to the rear, the division marched out in brigade front,
first northeastward into the open fields, then eastward toward the Union
lines.  As Pickett's men came into view near the woods, Pettigrew and Trimble
gave the order to advance.  Sons of Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Mississippi, comprising the brigades of Mayo, Davis, Marshall,
and Fry in front, followed closely by Lane and Lowrance, now moved out to
attack.  A gap between Pickett's left and Pettigrew's right would be closed as
the advance progressed.  The units were to converge as they approached the
Union lines so that the final stage of the charge would present a solid front.

Climax at Gettysburg

     Billows of smoke lay ahead of the Union men at the stone wall,
momentarily obscuring the enemy.  But trained observers on Little Round Top,
far to the south, could see in the rear of this curtain of smoke the waves of
Confederates starting forward.  Pickett, finding his brigades drifting
southeastward, ordered them to bear to the left, and the men turned toward the
copse of trees.  Kemper was now approaching on the south of the Codori
buildings; Garnett and Armistead were on the north.  Halted momentarily at the
Emmitsburg Road to remove fence rails, Pickett's troops, with Pettigrew on the
left, renewed the advance.  Pickett had anticipated frontal fire of artillery
and infantry from the strong Union positions at the stone walls on the ridge,
but now an unforeseen attack developed.  Union guns as far south as Little,
Round Top, along with batteries on Cemetery Hill, relieved from Confederate
fire at the Seminary buildings, opened on the right and left flanks.  As
Pickett's men drove toward the Union works at The Angle, Stannard's Vermont
troops, executing a right turn movement from their position south of the
copse, fired into the flank of the charging Confederates.  The advancing lines
crumbled, reformed, and again pressed ahead under terrific fire from the Union
batteries.

     But valor was not enough.  As the attackers neared the stone wall they
lost cohesion in the fury that engulfed them.  All along the wall the Union
infantry opened with volley after volley into the depleted ranks of Garnett
and Fry.  Armistead closed in, and with Lane and Lowrance joining him, made a
last concerted drive.  At this close range, double canister and concentrated
infantry fire cut wide gaps in the attacking front.  Garnett was mortally
wounded; Kemper was down, his lines falling away on the right and left.
Armistead reached the low stone fence.  In a final surge, he crossed the wall
with 150 men and, with his cap on his sword, shouted "Follow me!"  At the peak
of the charge, he fell mortally wounded.  From the ridge, Union troops rushed
forward and Hall's Michigan regiments let loose a blast of musketry.  The gray
column was surrounded.  The tide of the Confederacy had "swept to its crest,
paused, and receded."

     Two of the divisions in the charge were reduced to mere fragments.  In
front of the Union line, 20 fallen battle flags lay in a space of 100 yards
square.  Singly and in little clumps, the remnants of the gray columns that
had made the magnificent charge of a few minutes earlier now sullenly
retreated across the fields toward the Confederate lines.  Lee, who had
watched anxiously from Spangler's Woods, now rode out to meet his men.  "All
this has been my fault," he said to General Wilcox who had brought off his
command after heavy losses.  "It is I that have lost this fight, and you must
help me out of it in the best way you can."  And again that night, in a moment
of contemplation, he remarked to a comrade, "Too bad!  too bad!  Oh! too bad!"

Cavalry Action

     As the strength of Lee's mighty effort at The Angle was ebbing and the
scattered remnants of the charge were seeking shelter, action of a different
kind was taking place on another field not far distant.  Early in the
afternoon, Stuart's cavalry was making its way down the valley of Cress Run, 3
miles east of Gettysburg.  The brigades of Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, at the
rear of the line of march, momentarily lost the trail and came out into open
ground at the north end of Rummel's Woods.  Stuart, soon learning of the
mistake, attempted to bring them into line and to proceed southward.  But at
this point, Gen. D. M. Gregg's Union cavalry, in position along the Hanover
Road a mile southeast, saw the Confederates.  Gregg prepared at once to
attack, and Stuart had no choice but to fight on this ground.  As the two
forces moved closer, dismounted men opened a brisk fire, supported by the
accurate shelling of artillerists.

     Then came the initial cavalry charge and countercharge.  The Confederate
Jenkins was forced to withdraw when his small supply of ammunition became
exhausted.  Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss charged again and again, only
to be met with the equally spirited counterattack of McIntosh.  Custer's
Michigan regiments assailed the front of the charging Confederate troopers,
and Miller's squadron of the 3d Pennsylvania, disobeying orders to hold its
position, struck opportunely on the Confederate left.  The thrusts of the
Union horsemen, so well coordinated, stopped the onslaught of Stuart's
troopers.  After 3 hours of turbulent action, the Confederates left the field
and retired to the north of Gettysburg.  The Union horsemen, holding their
ground, had successfully cut off any prospect of Confederate cavalry aid in
the rear of the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge.

End of Invasion

     Lee, as he looked over the desolate field of dead and wounded and the
broken remnants of his once-powerful army still ready for renewed battle, must
have realized that not only was Gettysburg lost, but that eventually it might
all end this way.  Meade did not counterattack, as expected.  The following
day, July 4, the two armies lay facing each other, exhausted and torn.

     Late on the afternoon of July 4, Lee began an orderly retreat.  The wagon
train of wounded, 17 miles in length, guarded by Imboden's cavalry, started
homeward through Greenwood and Greencastle.  At night, the able-bodied men
marched over the Hagerstown Road by way of Monterey Pass to the Potomac Roads
had become nearly impassable from the heavy rains that day, hindering the
movements of both armies.  Meade, realizing that the Confederate Army was
actually retreating and not retiring to the mountain passes, sent detachments
of cavalry and infantry in pursuit and ordered the mountain passes west of
Frederick covered.  Lee, having the advantage of the more direct route to the
Potomac, reached the river several days ahead of his pursuers, but heavy rains
had swollen the current and he could not cross.  Meade arrived on the night of
July 12 and prepared for a general attack.  On the following night, however,
the river receded and Lee crossed safely into Virginia.  The Confederate Army,
Meade's critics said, had been permitted to slip from the Union grasp.